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When releasing data to the public, data stewards are ethically
and often legally obligated to protect the confidentiality of data sub-
jects’ identities and sensitive attributes. They also strive to release
data that are informative for a wide range of secondary analyses.
Achieving both objectives is particularly challenging when data stew-
ards seek to release highly resolved geographical information. We
present an approach for protecting the confidentiality of data with
geographic identifiers based on multiple imputation. The basic idea is
to convert geography to latitude and longitude, estimate a bivariate
response model conditional on attributes, and simulate new latitude
and longitude values from these models. We illustrate the proposed
methods using data describing causes of death in Durham, North
Carolina. In the context of the application, we present a straightfor-
ward tool for generating simulated geographies and attributes based
on regression trees, and we present methods for assessing disclosure
risks with such simulated data.
1. Introduction. Statistical agencies, research centers and individual re-
searchers frequently collect geographic data as an integral part of their stud-
ies. Geographic data can be highly beneficial for analyses. In studies of aging,
for example, they can reveal areas where elderly people live in high densities,
which is useful for policy and planning; they can illuminate how environ-
mental factors impact the health and quality of life of elderly people; and,
through contextual data, they can yield insights into the social and eco-
nomic conditions and lifestyle choices of the elderly. Analysts who do not
account for spatial dependencies may miss important geographic trends and
differences, potentially resulting in invalid inferences.
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Geographic variables also are among the most challenging data to share
when making a primary data source available to other researchers and the
broader public. Very fine geography, while facilitating detailed spatial anal-
yses, enables ill-intentioned users to infer the identities of individuals in the
shared file. Even modestly coarse geography can be risky in the presence
of demographic or other readily available attributes, which when combined
may identify individuals in the shared file. Such identifications are prob-
lematic for data collectors, who are ethically and often legally obligated
to protect data subjects’ confidentiality. To reduce the risks of disclosures,
data collectors typically delete or aggregate geographies to high levels before
sharing data. Unfortunately, deletion and aggregation sacrifice the quality
of analyses that utilize finer geographic detail.
We propose to protect the confidentiality of data with fine geographic
identifiers by simulating values of geographies and other identifying at-
tributes from statistical models that capture the spatial dependencies among
the variables in the collected data. These simulated values replace the col-
lected ones when sharing data. To enable estimation of variances, the data
steward generates several versions of the data sets for dissemination, result-
ing in multiply-imputed, partially synthetic data sets [Little (1993), Reiter
(2003)]. Such data sets can protect confidentiality, since identification of
units and their sensitive data can be difficult when the geographies and
other quasi-identifiers in the released data are not actual, collected values.
And, when the simulation models faithfully reflect the relationships in the
collected data, the shared data can preserve spatial associations, avoid eco-
logical inference problems, and facilitate small area estimation.
The remainder of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we describe some
of the shortcomings of current approaches to protecting data with geogra-
phies, and we motivate the use of multiple imputation for releasing public
use data with highly resolved geographies. In Section 3 we generate multiply-
imputed, partially synthetic versions of a spatially-referenced data set de-
scribing causes of death in Durham, North Carolina. As part of the appli-
cation, we present an easy-to-implement data simulator based on sequential
regression trees for synthesizing highly-resolved geographies or attributes.
We also describe methods for assessing disclosure risks for data with syn-
thetic geographies. These include (i) a new measure for quantifying the risks
that the original geographies could be recovered from the simulated data,
and (ii) a measure for assessing risks of re-identifications based on the ap-
proach of Reiter and Mitra (2009). In Section 4 we conclude with issues for
implementation of the approach.
2. Motivation for using simulated geographies. At first glance, releas-
ing or sharing safe data seems a straightforward task: simply strip unique
identifiers like names and tax identification numbers before releasing data.
However, these actions alone may not suffice when other readily available
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variables, such as geographic or demographic data, remain on the file. These
quasi-identifiers can be used to match units in the released data to other
databases. When the quasi-identifiers include geographic variables, the risks
of identification disclosures can be extremely high. For example, Sweeney
[(2001), pages 51 and 52] showed that 97% of the records in a publicly avail-
able voter registration list for Cambridge, MA, could be identified using only
birth date and 9-digit zip code. Because of the disclosive nature of geogra-
phy, the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
Privacy Rule requires that, when sharing certain health data, the released
geographic units comprise at least 20,000 people [Federal Register (2000),
page 82543].
Data stewards can protect confidentiality by restricting public access to
the data. For example, analysts can use the data only in secure data enclaves,
such as the Research Data Centers operated by the U.S. Census Bureau. Or,
analysts can submit queries to remote access systems that provide statistical
output without revealing the data that generated the output. While useful,
restricted access strategies are only a partial solution. Analysts who do not
live near a secure data enclave, or do not have the resources to relocate
temporarily to be near one, are shut out from this form of access. Gaining
restricted access can require months of proposal preparation and background
checks; analysts cannot simply walk in to any secure data enclave and imme-
diately start working with the data. Remote access servers limit the scope of
analyses and details of output, since clever queries can reveal individual data
values [Gomatam et al. (2005)]. Performing exploratory data analysis and
checking model fit are difficult without access to record-level data. Hence,
as recommended by two recent National Research Council panels on data
confidentiality, to maintain the benefits of wide dissemination, it is necessary
to supplement restricted access strategies with readily available, record-level
data [National Research Council (2005, 2007)].
2.1. Common approaches to protecting geography. Data stewards com-
monly employ several strategies for protecting confidentiality when sharing
data with geographic identifiers. However, these methods can have serious
impacts on the quality of the released data, as we now describe.
Data suppression. Data stewards can suppress geography or attributes
from data releases. The intensity of suppression can range from not releasing
entire variables, for example, stripping the file of all geographic identifiers,
to not releasing small subsets of values, for example, blanking out sensitive
attribute values. An example of the former is the Health and Retirement
Study: the public use data do not contain any geographic information on
relocations [Health and Retirement Study (2007), page 14]. Increasing the in-
tensity of suppression generally increases data protection and decreases data
quality. While intense suppression can reduce risks, it has repercussions for
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inferences. Wholesale deletion of geographic identifiers disables any spatial
analysis. When relationships depend on the omitted geography, analysts’
inferences are biased. Selective suppression of geography or attributes cre-
ates data that are missing not at random, which complicates analyses for
users. When there are many records at risk, as is likely the case when the
data have fine geographic identifiers, data stewards may need to suppress so
many values to achieve satisfactory protection that the released data have
very limited quality for spatial analysis.
Data aggregation. Data stewards can coarsen geography or other vari-
ables, for example, releasing addresses at the block or county rather than
parcel level, or releasing ages in five year intervals. Aggregation reduces dis-
closure risks by turning unique records—which generally are most at risk—
into nonunique records. For example, there may be only one person with
a particular combination of demographic characteristics in a street block,
but many people with those characteristics in a state. Releasing data for
this person with geography at the street level might have a high disclosure
risk, whereas releasing the data at the state level might not. The amount of
aggregation needed to protect confidentiality depends on the nature of the
data. When other identifying attributes are present, such as demographic
characteristics, high-level aggregation of the geographic identifiers may be
needed to achieve adequate protection. For example, there may be only one
person of a certain age, sex, race and marital status—which may be available
to ill-intentioned users at low cost—in a particular county, so that coarsen-
ing geographies to the county level provides no greater protection for that
person than does releasing the exact address.
Aggregation preserves analyses at the level of aggregation. However, it
can create ecological inference fallacies [Robinson (1950), Freedman (2004)]
at lower levels of aggregation. Additionally, when geography is highly aggre-
gated, analysts may be unable to detect important local spatial dependen-
cies. Despite these limitations, aggregation is the most widely used solution
to protect data with geographic identifiers and is routinely implemented
by government agencies and other data collectors. The U.S. Census Bu-
reau, for example, does not release geographic identifiers below aggregates
of at least 100,000 people in public use files of census data. The public use
files for the Health and Retirement Study aggregate geography to “a level
no higher than U.S. Census Region and Division” [Health and Retirement
Study (2007), page 14].
Aggregation also is frequently used to disguise values in the tails of non-
geographic quasi-identifiers, especially age. The HIPAA requires that all ages
above 89 be aggregated into and shared as a single category, “90 or older.”
Random noise addition. Data stewards can disguise geographic and other
attribute values by adding some randomly selected amount to each confi-
dential observed value. For geographic attributes, this involves moving an
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observed location to another randomly drawn location, usually within a cir-
cle of some radius r centered at the original location. The quality of infer-
ences and the amount of protection depend crucially on r. When a large r
is needed to protect confidentiality—as is likely the case when data contain
readily available quasi-identifiers—inferences involving spatial relationships
can be seriously degraded [Armstrong, Rushton and Zimmerman (1999),
VanWey et al. (2005)]. Adding random noise to attribute values introduces
measurement error, which inflates variances and attenuates regression coef-
ficients [Fuller (1993)].
Random data swapping. Data stewards can swap data values for se-
lected records, for example, switch values of age, race and sex for at-risk
records with those for other records, to discourage users from matching,
since matches may be based on incorrect data [Dalenius and Reiss (1982),
Fienberg and McIntyre (2004)]. Swapping is used extensively by government
agencies. It is generally presumed that swapping fractions are low—agencies
do not reveal the rates to the public—because swapping at high levels de-
stroys relationships involving the swapped and unswapped variables. Be-
cause data stewards might have to swap all geographic identifiers to ensure
released records do not have their actual geographies, swapping is not effec-
tive for highly resolved geographic identifiers.
2.2. Proposed approach: Simulate geographic identifiers. The main limi-
tation of the approaches in Section 2.1 is that they perturb the geography or
other quasi-identifiers with minimal or no consideration of the relationships
among the variables. Our proposed approach explicitly aims to preserve
relationships among the geographic and other attributes through statistical
modeling. At the same time, replacing geographic and other quasi-identifiers
with imputations makes it difficult for ill-intentioned users to know the orig-
inal values of those variables, which reduces the chance of disclosures.
Our approach differs from the recent proposal of Zhou, Dominici and
Louis (2010), who use spatial smoothing to mask nongeographic attributes
at the original locations. Releasing the original locations can result in high
risks of identification disclosures when the data include fine geography. Zhou,
Dominici and Louis (2010) do not intend to deal with these risks, whereas
we explicitly seek to do so. We note that spatial smoothing could be used
to mask attribute values after synthesis of locations.
To illustrate how our approach might work in practice, we modify the
setting described by Reiter (2004a). Suppose that a statistical agency has
collected data on a random sample of 10,000 heads of households in a state.
The data comprise each person’s street block, age, sex, income and an in-
dicator of disease status. Suppose that combining street block, age and sex
uniquely determines a large percentage of records in the sample and the
population. Therefore, the agency wants to replace street block, age and
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sex for all people in the sample—or possibly only a fraction of the three
variables, for example, only street block for some records and only age and
sex for others—to disguise their identities. The agency generates values of
street block, age and sex for these people by randomly simulating values
from their joint distribution (see Section 2.3), conditional on their disease
status and income values. This distribution is estimated with the collected
data. The result is one partially synthetic data set. The agency repeats this
process, say, ten times, and these ten data sets are released to the public.
To illustrate how a secondary data analyst might utilize these shared data
sets, suppose that the analyst seeks to fit a logistic regression of disease
status on income, age, sex and indicator variables for the person’s county
(obtained by aggregating the released, simulated street blocks). The analyst
first estimates the regression coefficients and their variances separately in
each simulated data set using standard likelihood-based estimates and stan-
dard software. Then, the analyst averages the estimated coefficients and
variances across the simulated data sets. These averages are used to form
95% confidence intervals based on the simple formulas developed by Reiter
(2003), described below.
The agency creates m partially synthetic data sets, D(1), . . . ,D(m), that it
shares with the public. Let Q be the secondary analyst’s estimand of inter-
est, such as a regression coefficient or population average. For l = 1, . . . ,m,
let q(l) and u(l) be respectively the estimate of Q and the estimate of the
variance of q(l) in synthetic data set D(l). Secondary analysts use q¯m =∑m
l=1 q
(l)/m to estimate Q and Tm = u¯m+ bm/m to estimate var(q¯m), where
bm =
∑m
l=1(q
(l) − q¯m)2/(m − 1) and u¯m =
∑m
l=1 u
(l)/m. For large samples,
inferences for Q are obtained from the t-distribution, (q¯m−Q)∼ tνm(0, Tm),
where the degrees of freedom is νm = (m− 1)[1 +mu¯m/bm]2. Details of the
derivations of these methods are in Reiter (2003). Tests of significance for
multicomponent null hypotheses are derived by Reiter (2005c).
Partially synthetic data sets can have positive data utility features. When
data are simulated from distributions that reflect the distributions of the
collected data, Reiter (2003, 2004b, 2005c) shows that analysts can obtain
valid inferences (e.g., 95% confidence intervals contain the true values 95%
of the time) for wide classes of estimands. These inferences are determined
by combining standard likelihood-based or survey-weighted estimates; the
analyst need not learn new statistical methods or software to adjust for the
effects of the disclosure limitation. The released data can include simulated
values in the tails of distributions, for example, there is no top-coding of
ages or incomes [however, it is challenging to develop synthesis models that
simultaneously protect confidentiality and preserve inferences when data
are very sparse in tails; see Reiter (2005b)]. Because many quasi-identifiers
including geography can be simulated, finer details of geography can be
released, facilitating estimation for small areas and spatial analyses.
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There is a cost to these benefits: the validity of inferences depends on the
validity of the models used to generate the simulated data. The extent of
this dependence is driven by the nature of the synthesis. For example, when
all of age and sex are synthesized, analyses involving those variables reflect
only the relationships included in the data generation models. When the
models fail to reflect certain relationships accurately, analysts’ inferences
also will not reflect those relationships. Similarly, incorrect distributional
assumptions built into the models will be passed on to the users’ analyses.
On the other hand, when replacing only a select fraction of age and sex
and leaving many original values on the file, inferences are less sensitive to
the assumptions of the simulated data models. In practice, this dependence
means that data stewards should release information that helps analysts
decide whether or not the simulated data are reliable for their analyses. For
example, data stewards might include the data generation models (without
parameter estimates) as attachments to public releases of data. Or, they
might include generic statements that describe the imputation models, such
as “Main effects and interactions for age, sex, income and disease status are
included in the imputation models for street blocks.” Analysts who desire
finer detail than afforded by the imputations may have to apply for restricted
access to the collected data.
When generating partially synthetic data, the data steward must choose
which values to synthesize and must specify models to simulate replacements
of those values. In most existing partially synthetic data sets, stewards re-
place all values of variables that they deem to be either (i) readily available
to ill-intentioned users seeking to identify released records, or (ii) too sen-
sitive to risk releasing exactly. However, it may be sufficient from a confi-
dentiality perspective to replace only portions of some variables; see Little,
Liu and Raghunathan (2004). The process of specifying synthesis models is
typically iterative: the data steward creates synthetic data using a posited
model, checks the quality of a large number of representative analyses with
the synthetic data, and adjusts the models as necessary to improve quality
while maintaining confidentiality protection. For examples of this process,
see Drechsler and Reiter (2010) and Kinney et al. (2011).
The data steward also must determine m, that is, how many synthetic
data sets to release. Generally, increasing m results in decreased standard
errors in secondary analyses. However, increasing m results in greater data
storage costs and possibly increased disclosure risks [Reiter and Mitra (2009)].
When small fractions of values are synthesized (e.g., around 10%), the effi-
ciency gains from increasing m are typically modest, so that data stewards
can make m modest, for example, m = 5, to keep risks and storage costs
comparatively low. When large fractions of values are replaced, efficiency
gains from increasing m can be substantial [Drechsler and Reiter (2010)]. In
such cases, we recommend that data stewards select the largest m that still
offers acceptable risks and storage costs.
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2.3. Synthesis models for sharing precise geographies. Our strategy for
simulating geographies involves four general steps. First, the data steward
converts the geographic variables on the file to latitudes and longitudes (pos-
sibly, using UTM projection to Eastings and Northings). When the collected
geographies are aggregated rather than precise locations, the data steward
uses a typical value for the location of all records in that area; for example,
use the latitude and longitude of the centroid of the street block. Second,
the data steward estimates a model for latitudes and longitudes conditional
on other variables in the data set. Third, using this model, the data steward
simulates new latitudes and longitudes for every record in the file. Fourth
and finally, the data steward releases multiple draws of the simulated lati-
tudes and longitudes along with the other attributes—which also might be
altered to protect confidentiality, for example, Zhou, Dominici and Louis
(2010)—in the original file.
We expect that, in general, some attributes in the data will exhibit spa-
tial dependence. When considering location as the response variable, this
implies a joint distribution for latitude and longitude that depends on the
attributes and is possibly multi-modal. For example, people of similar age,
socio-economic status and other demographic characteristics tend to cluster
in neighborhoods, and certain demographic characteristics may be highly
prevalent in multiple locations but absent in others. If we ignore these fea-
tures when simulating geographies—or alter geography with approaches that
do not explicitly account for these associations—the spatial relationships in
the data will be altered or destroyed.
To illustrate some possible response models for locations, let φi and λi
denote the latitude and longitude, respectively, for data subject i. Let xi
denote the p nongeographical attributes for data subject i. One family of
convenient response models is (λi, φi)∼N(µi,Ωi), where each µi = h(xi) is
a 2× 1 vector of unknown means, h(xi) is a function of the covariates, and
each Ωi is an unknown 2× 2 covariance matrix. A simple implementation is
a bivariate regression model with h(xi) = β0+
∑p
j=1 hj(xij)βj , where each hj
is a spline for variable j and Ωi =Ω for all i. An alternative is a mixture
model with h(xi) = βi0 +
∑
j hj(xij)βij , where βi = (βi0, . . . , βip) and Ωi
come from K mixture components.
In specifying a response model for locations, the data steward should in-
clude components of x that vary with spatial locations. The data steward
also should seek a flexible model that can adapt to a potentially complex
response distribution. In the application, we describe a semi-automated ap-
proach for approximating the response distribution that can be easily imple-
mented by data stewards. We emphasize, however, that the idea of treating
latitude and longitude as a response is general, and that data stewards can
improve the quality of the released data by tailoring the response model to
their particular problem.
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To our knowledge, treating geography as a continuous response and re-
leasing simulated draws from its distribution has not been previously im-
plemented. However, partially synthetic data are used to protect locations
in the Census Bureau’s OnTheMap project [Machanavajjhala et al. (2008)].
In that project, Machanavajjhala et al. (2008) synthesize the street blocks
where people live conditional on the street blocks where they work and
other block-level attributes. They use multinomial regressions to simulate
home-block values, constraining the possible outcome space for each indi-
vidual based on where they work. Our approach differs from the OnTheMap
modeling in that (i) we model more precise geography, that is, continuous
versions of latitudes and longitudes, than discrete street blocks, and (ii)
we do not rely on a fixed set of geographic locations, that is, where peo-
ple work, to anchor the synthesis models. Furthermore, for settings with
high-dimensional xi and no obvious way to set constraints on the outcome
space, multinomial regressions can be computationally demanding if even
estimable, whereas continuous response models are readily estimated.
3. Application: Protecting a cause of death file. We now apply the mul-
tiple imputation approach to create disclosure-protected data on a subset
of North Carolina (NC) mortality records in 2002. The data include pre-
cise longitudes and latitudes of deceased individuals’ residences, as well as
a variety of variables related to manner of death; we consider the subset of
variables in Table 1. These mortality data are in fact publicly available and
so do not require disclosure protection. Nonetheless, they are ideal test data
for methods that protect confidentiality of geographies since, unlike many
data sets on human individuals, actual locations are available and can be
Table 1
Description of variables used in the empirical study
Variable Range
Longitude Recoded to go from 1–100
Latitude Recoded to go from 1–100
Sex Male, female
Race White, black
Age (years) 16–99
Autopsy performed Yes, no, missing
Autopsy findings Yes, no missing
Marital status 5 categories
Attendant Physician, medical examiner, coroner
Hispanic 7 categories
Education (years) 0–17 years
Hospital type 8 categories
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revealed for comparisons. Access to the data is managed by the Children’s
Environmental Health Initiative at Duke University per agreement with the
state of NC.
We use individuals whose place of residence was one of seven contiguous
postal zones in Durham, NC. These areas are heterogeneous in terms of
population density and characteristics. For simplicity, we include only indi-
viduals with race of black and white—which comprised 99% of all records in
these postal zones—resulting in n= 2,670 observed cases. We also collapse
the cause of death variable into two levels: death from diseases of the circu-
latory and respiratory system, and death from all other causes. We consider
this binary variable, which we label Y , as the outcome for regression models.
In these data, Y does not exhibit strong residual spatial dependence after
accounting for other variables. Therefore, for a more thorough test of the
analytical validity of the synthetic data sets, we also generate a surrogate
cause of death variable, Y˜ , that exhibits spatial clustering and is depen-
dent on several nongeographic variables. To do so, we generate outcomes as
follows:
Y˜i ∼ Bern(pii),(1)
where logit(pii) = 0.02 + Sexi + Racei + 0.003Agei+w(si), si = (λi, φi),
and w(s) is a mean zero Gaussian process with exponential covariance func-
tion C(s, s′) = σ2e exp(−φe‖s− s′‖2). We set the parameters of the exponen-
tial covariance function to σ2e = 2 and φe = 0.06, so that the effective range
(i.e., the distance at which the spatial correlation drops to 0.05) is about
− log(0.05)/φe = 50, which equals half of the overall range of the latitudes
and longitudes in Table 1. The coefficients of the covariates are specified so
that the covariates have strong effects. All results that follow use Y˜ in place
of the actual cause of death Y ; see the online supplement [Wang and Reiter
(2011)] for selected results based on Y . For both Y˜ and Y , the results are
qualitatively similar, in that the actual spatial relationships (or lack thereof)
in the original data are approximately preserved in the synthetic data sets.
3.1. Generation of synthetic data. We examined several methods for
simulating latitude and longitude, including mixtures of bivariate regres-
sions, bivariate partition models [De’ath (2002)] using the “mvpart” func-
tion in R, Bayesian additive regression trees [Chipman, George and Mc-
Culloch (2010)], and classification and regression trees (CART) [Breiman
et al. (1984)]. Among these, the CART synthesizer resulted in data sets with
a desirable profile in terms of low disclosure risks and high data usefulness.
Furthermore, the CART synthesizer is fastest computationally and easy to
implement, as it requires minimal tuning. It scales to large data sets with
many predictors and many observations. In comparison to the CART syn-
thesizer, the Bayesian trees and mixture model synthesizers were far more
computationally demanding, and the bivariate partition model synthesizer
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resulted in unacceptably high disclosure risks. We therefore present results
only for the CART synthesizer, which we now summarize; see Reiter (2005d)
for further information on CART synthesizers.
Let x include all nongeographic attributes in Table 1 and Y˜ . First, we
fit a regression tree of longitude on x. Label the tree as Tλ, where λ stands
for longitude. Let Lλ,w be the wth leaf in Tλ, and let λLλ,w be the nLλ,w
values of λ in leaf Lλ,w. In each Lλ,w, we draw nLλ,w values from λLλ,w
using the Bayesian bootstrap [Rubin (1981)]. We then smooth the density
of the bootstrapped values using a Gaussian kernel density estimator with
bandwidth hλ and support over the smallest to the largest value of λLλ,w .
To get a synthetic longitude for the ith unit, we trace down Tλ based on
the unit’s values of xi, and we sample randomly from the estimated mixture
density in that unit’s leaf. The result is a set of synthetic longitudes, λ˜(l).
Next, we fit the regression tree of latitude on x and the true λ; label the
tree as Tφ, where φ stands for latitude. To locate the ith person’s leaf in Tφ,
we use λ˜
(l)
i in place of λi. For units with combinations of (xi, λ˜
(l)
i ) that do not
belong to one of the leaves of Tφ, we search up the tree until we find a node
that contains the combination, and treat that node as if it were the unit’s
leaf. Once each unit’s leaf is located, values of φ
(l)
i are generated using the
Bayesian bootstrap and kernel density procedure with bandwidth hφ. The
result is a set of synthetic latitudes, φ˜(l), and, therefore, synthetic locations
s˜
(l) = (λ˜(l), φ˜(l)).
We repeat the process of generating s˜(l) independently m times, resulting
in the collection of partially synthetic data sets, D(l) = {x, s˜(l)} where l= 1,
. . . ,m. With no further synthesis of x, these m data sets would be released
to the public.
We also performed the synthesis by generating latitude first and longitude
second. As reported in the online supplement [Wang and Reiter (2011)], this
ordering results in slightly decreased disclosure risks and slightly worse data
utility. We recommend that data stewards try both orderings and choose
the one that results in the more desirable risk-utility profile. For general
discussions on the order of synthesis, see Reiter (2005d) and Caiola and
Reiter (2010).
We also investigate simulating both geography and nongeographic identi-
fiers to further improve confidentiality protection. Specifically, we simulate
values of race (R) and age (A) in addition to (λ,φ). We choose these two
variables because (i) in many applications, age and race might be considered
available to ill-intentioned users and hence prominent candidates for disclo-
sure protection, (ii) their distributions clearly depend on location in the NC
mortality data, and (iii) they encompass the generic modeling challenges of
a continuous and a categorical variable.
The process proceeds as follows. Simulate (λ˜, φ˜) using the CART synthe-
sizers as before, but excluding R and A from x. We simulate new values
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Fig. 1. Scatter plots of synthetic longitudes (left) and latitudes (right) against real ones
under the synthesis model that imputes geography only with h= 1.
of A using a CART synthesizer fit with (x, λ,φ). Each Ai is simulated based
on its (λ˜i, φ˜i). We simulate new values of R using a CART synthesizer fit
with (x, λ,φ,A). Each Ri is simulated based on its (λ˜i, φ˜i, A˜i).
For all trees, we require the smallest node size to be at least five, and
we cease splitting a leaf when the deviance of values in the leaf is less than
0.0001; see Section 4 for discussion of selecting these tuning parameters.
All CART models are fit in R using the “tree” function. The bandwidth
sizes are directly related to the analytical utility and disclosure risks of the
synthetic data sets. Here, we investigate the risk-utility trade-offs for three
bandwidths: hλ = hφ ∈ {1,5,10}. We set the bandwidth for generating A˜
equal to 2. We generate m= 5 synthetic data sets.
3.2. Evaluation of confidentiality protection. For an initial evaluation of
the protection engendered by simulation, we plot (λ˜, φ˜) against (λ,φ) for one
simulated data set when only geography is imputed with h= 1; see Figure 1.
Clearly, (λ˜i, φ˜i) can vary greatly from (λi, φi). However, Figure 1 is a crude
evaluation, as intruders can utilize information from the multiple synthetic
data sets and possibly other information to attempt disclosures.
We now outline frameworks for evaluating disclosure risks. We begin with
an approach for quantifying how much intruders can learn about actual
geographies from the synthetic data.
3.2.1. Risk of geography disclosure. In this section we assume that geog-
raphy is the only synthesized variable, although the general ideas and ap-
proach apply to other attributes and with additional synthetic data.
Let s˜i = (s˜
(1)
i , . . . , s˜
(m)
i ); let S˜ be the collection of s˜i for all n persons in
the sample; and, let S include all n original values of si. Let S−i be all
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the original geography except for that of the ith person. Let M represent
any meta-data released by the data steward about the synthesis models, for
example, the code for the computer program that generated that synthetic
data (without the original data or parameter estimates). Let I represent
the intruder’s prior information on persons’ geography in the sample, for
example, I might include S−i. Either M or I could be empty.
We posit an intruder whose goal is to estimate si for one or more target
records in the database. Specifically, for any record i, the intruder seeks the
posterior distribution of si given (X, S˜,M, I). With this posterior distribu-
tion, the intruder could identify high density regions for the unknown si,
which, if precise enough, could be used to pinpoint the true location of the
target individual. Using Bayes’ rule, we have
P (si|X, S˜,M, I)∝ P (S˜|X, si,M, I)P (si|X,M, I),(2)
where P (si|X,M, I) represents the intruder’s prior beliefs about si.
The information in M and I play central roles in the likelihood func-
tion P (S˜|X, si,M, I). For example, suppose that M contains the code of
the computer program used to generate the synthetic data (without origi-
nal data or parameter estimates). If I includes S−i, the intruder could take
guesses at si according to his or her prior distribution and, with the resulting
guess of S, determine the likelihood of S˜. If instead I contains only a portion
of the geographies or is empty, as are likely to be the cases in practice, the
computation of the likelihood becomes much more complex and uncertain,
since the intruder needs to guess at multiple unknown geographies. In such
cases, one simple approximation of the distribution for si is the convex hull
of the set s˜i. Given the variation in Figure 1, these regions in the mortality
data could be quite large.
The intruder’s prior distribution is also a key determinant of the poste-
rior distribution of si. An intruder may know the locations of all individuals
in the population with certain characteristics contained in xi, and the prior
distribution could be uniform over those locations. An intruder who knows x
and S−i could estimate a model from these data to predict si, and use that
as a prior distribution. An intruder with no external information might use
a uniform distribution on the map of possible locations. Unfortunately, it is
nearly impossible for the data steward to know the information possessed
by the intruder. Hence, it is prudent for the data steward to consider disclo-
sure risks under a variety of assumptions about the intruders’ knowledge—
including very extensive prior knowledge, which represents possible worst
case scenarios—as we now demonstrate.
Using the CART synthesizer, we consider two scenarios for the NC mortal-
ity data: a high-risk scenario in which the intruders know everything except
for one target’s si, that is, X and S−i, and a low-risk scenario in which
the intruder does not know any records’ geographies. We assume that M
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includes everything about the trees except the individual geographies in the
nodes, that is, the data steward releases the splitting rules for each tree and
the kernel bandwidths. For the risky scenario, we assume the intruder’s prior
distribution is uniform on a grid over a small area containing the target’s
true latitude and longitude, and estimate equation (2) using importance
sampling; see the online supplement [Wang and Reiter (2011)] for details.
Because the small area contains the true value, this prior distribution repre-
sents strong intruder prior knowledge. We note that other specifications for
the prior distribution could change the value of the risk measure.
To summarize how much the CART synthesis protects geographies, we
create two risk metrics. Let (φi,t, λi,t) be a draw from P (si|X, S˜,M, I). The
metrics are
R1 =
[∫
{(φi − φi,t)2 + (λi − λi,t)2}P (φi,t, λi,t|X, S˜,M, I)dφi,t dλi,t
]1/2
,
R2 = number of actual cases in circle centered at (φi, λi) with radius R1.
Here, R1 measures the average Euclidean distance between the intruder’s
guess of geography and the actual geography. Larger values of R1 (up to
a max of 100
√
2) indicate larger uncertainty in predicting si, so that intrud-
ers’ predictions are more likely to be further away from the true geography;
thus, larger values of R1 indicate smaller disclosure risks. Larger values of R2
indicate that many actual locations (up to a max of n= 2,670) are reason-
able guesses at si, thus smaller disclosure risks.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for R1 and R2 for all n= 2,670 records
in the database. For the low-risk scenario, the medians of R1 for all three
bandwidth values are around 21 distance units, and the medians of R2 are
around 670 units, indicating that most si are estimated with sizable uncer-
tainty. In this scenario, each person’s R1-radius circle contains at least 27
other cases. Interestingly, for this scenario, increasing the bandwidth does
Table 2
Summary of geography disclosure risks for the low risk and high risk scenarios for
different bandwidths h when synthesizing only geography. For each risk measure, α0 is
the minimum, α25 is the first quartile, and α50 is the median
h= 1 h= 5 h= 10
Scenario Risk α0 α25 α50 α0 α25 α50 α0 α25 α50
Low R1 4.2 15.6 21.6 3.6 15.4 20.8 3.8 16.0 21.4
R2 36 384 680 27 373 640 43 393 674
High R1 0.0 4.3 9.7 2.1 9.7 14.2 3.4 13.1 17.8
R2 0 34 159 4 149 327 13 253 474
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not substantially increase the uncertainty in si. For the high-risk scenario,
the intruder can estimate si with better accuracy than in the low-risk sce-
nario. Here, both R1 and R2 decrease with h. In fact, when h = 1, there
are individuals in the data who are alone in their R1-radius circles. The
boxplot of Figure 2 in the online supplement [Wang and Reiter (2011)] pro-
vides additional information about the distributions of R1 and R2, including
those under different scenarios when generating latitude first and longitude
second.
3.2.2. Risk of identification. The approach in Section 3.2.1 can be used
to estimate posterior distributions of any attribute, of which location is
one example. Often, however, data stewards want to assess the risks that
individuals in the released data can be re-identified. To quantify these risks,
we now compute probabilities of identification [Duncan and Lambert (1989),
Fienberg, Makov and Sanil (1997), Reiter (2005a)] by adapting the approach
of Drechsler and Reiter (2008) and Reiter and Mitra (2009) for synthetic
geographies.
In this approach, the data steward mimics the behavior of an intruder who
possesses the true values of the quasi-identifiers, including geographies, for
selected target records (or even the entire database). To illustrate, suppose
the intruder has a vector of information, t, on a particular target unit in the
population which may or may not correspond to a unit in the m released
synthetic data sets, D = {D(1), . . . ,D(m)}. Let t0 be the unique identifier
(e.g., the individual’s name) of the target, and let dj0 be the (not released)
unique identifier for record j in D, where j = 1, . . . , n. The intruder’s goal is
to match unit j in D to the target when dj0 = t0, and not to match when
dj0 6= t0 for any j ∈D.
Let J be a random variable that equals j when dj0 = t0 for j ∈ D and
equals n + 1 when dj0 = t0 for some j /∈ D. The intruder thus seeks to
calculate the P (J = j|t,D,M) for j = 1, . . . , n + 1. He or she then would
decide whether or not any of the identification probabilities for j = 1, . . . , n
are large enough to declare an identification. Let T be all original values of
the variables that were synthesized. Because the intruder does not know the
actual values in T, he or she should integrate over its possible values when
computing the match probabilities. Hence, for each record in D we compute
P (J = j|t,D,M) =
∫
Pr(J = j|t,D,T,M, I)Pr(T|t,D,M, I)dT.
This integral can be approximated using Monte Carlo approaches; details
are in the online supplement. Once again, the data steward must make
assumptions about I , the information the intruder knows about the targets.
Data stewards can summarize the risks for the entire data set using func-
tions of these match probabilities [Reiter (2005a)]. Let cj be the number of
records in the data set with the highest match probability for the target tj .
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Let gj = 1 if the true match is among the cj units, and gj = 0 otherwise.
The expected match risk equals
∑
j(1/cj)gj/n. The true match risk equals∑
j kj/n, where kj = 1 when cjgj = 1, and kj = 0 otherwise. The false match
risk equals
∑
j fj(1− gj)/
∑
j fj , where fj = 1 when cj = 1 and fj = 0 other-
wise. Effective disclosure limitation techniques have low expected and true
match risks, and high false match risks.
Using the mortality data, we consider three scenarios with different in-
formation in M . In the first M contains everything, that is, details of the
CART models, the splitting rules and the real data values in each leaf and
internal node. Essentially, M is a data simulator that enables analysts to
generate new synthetic data sets using the same process as the data stew-
ard. In the secondM contains descriptions of the CART models, but not the
specific splitting rules nor the real data values in each leaf and internal node.
Essentially, this is akin to releasing the code used to simulate data without
providing any parameter values for it. In the third M is empty, that is, the
data steward says nothing about how the data were collected.
For all scenarios, we suppose that intruders have a file containing the
true values of sex, race, marital status, age and geography for all n= 2,670
units in the data set, and that they seek to match records in D to this file.
We also suppose that the intruder knows which records were in the sam-
ple, so that P (J = 2671|t,D,M) = 0. We compute each target’s probability
independently of other targets’ probabilities and match with replacement.
Table 3 summarizes risk measures in one set of m= 5 synthetic data sets
for each bandwidth and scenario. Three general trends are evident; these
persist in two additional runs of the simulation as well. First, the synthesis
of age and race dramatically decreases disclosure risks. Indeed, we suspect
Table 3
Summary of risk measures under different scenarios when synthesizing only geography
and when synthesizing geography, age and race. Here, E is expected match risk, T is true
match risk, and F is false match risk. Results based on one simulation run per scenario
h= 1 h= 5 h= 10
Information in M E T F E T F E T F
Synthesizing geography only
Empty 0.21 0.15 0.76 0.19 0.12 0.78 0.18 0.11 0.80
Code, no parameters 0.21 0.19 0.78 0.19 0.16 0.80 0.18 0.15 0.82
Everything 0.34 0.32 0.48 – – – – – –
Synthesizing geography, age and race
Empty 0.010 0.008 0.98 0.008 0.007 0.99 0.007 0.006 0.99
Code, no parameters 0.009 0.009 0.99 0.008 0.008 0.99 0.005 0.005 0.99
Everything 0.034 0.034 0.94 – – – – – –
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that many data stewards would consider the numbers of true matches un-
acceptably high for synthesizing geography only and perhaps acceptable
for synthesizing geography, age and race. Second, releasing additional infor-
mation in M increases the disclosure risks. This trend is particularly pro-
nounced when synthesizing only geography, and less so when synthesizing
geography, age and race. For the latter synthesis strategy, the incremental
risk of releasing the synthesis code without parameters over releasing noth-
ing is modest, suggesting that it is worth releasing M to improve analysts’
understanding of the disclosure limitation applied to the data. Third, the
risks tend to increase as the bandwidth for geography synthesis decreases.
This is because larger h implies larger variances in the synthetic locations.
3.3. Evaluation of analytical validity. As with disclosure risks, the ex-
tent to which synthetic data sets can support analytically valid inferences
depends on the properties of the synthesizer. In this section we examine the
quality of synthetic data inferences for several estimands in the NC mortality
data set. Based on the huge reductions in disclosure risks, we only consider
scenarios with (λ,φ,R,A) synthesized. The online supplement [Wang and
Reiter (2011)] provides corresponding results with only (λ,φ) synthesized.
Table 4 summarizes a repeated sampling experiment involving descrip-
tive estimands at the zip code level. For each of 100 simulation runs, we
create m= 5 synthetic data sets using the observed mortality data (with Y˜ )
and the CART synthesizers with h ∈ (1,5,10). For the percentage-related
estimands, the mean square error (MSE) is typically less than 3%, and for
age-related estimands, the MSE is typically less than 2.5 years. The MSEs
for age-related estimands are generally smaller than the other MSEs be-
cause age does not vary spatially as much as the other variables do; hence,
the synthesis process for age is comparatively robust to imperfect modeling
of the relationship between geographies and the attributes. The MSEs tend
to increase as h increases, although the changes for the most part are only
3% or smaller. Overall, the results suggest that the synthetic data do a rea-
sonable job of preserving the aggregated spatial relationships in the data for
these variables.
We next evaluate inferences from two regression models. The first is
a standard logistic regression of Y˜ on main effects for sex, age and race.
The second is a Bayesian spatial logistic regression of Y˜ on main effects for
sex, age and race that uses an exponential covariance function for spatial
random effects, as in (1). To aid in the evaluation of the synthetic data sets,
we randomly choose 2,470 people as a training set to fit the models and the
remaining 200 people as a testing set to evaluate the predictive performance.
Because the sample size of this training set is large for fitting hierarchical
spatial random-effects models, we use Gaussian predictive process models
[Banerjee et al. (2008)] to reduce computational burden. To do so, we select
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Table 4
Summary of simulation results for descriptive estimands when imputing both geography
and nongeography. Q stands for the population values; ME and MSE stand for the
median and mean square error of q¯5 across the 100 simulations
h= 1 h= 5 h= 10
Estimand ZIP Q ME MSE ME MSE ME MSE
% black Z1 61.1 59.6 2.4 56.2 4.9 55.7 5.6
Z2 41.1 43.4 1.6 41.8 1.7 40.8 1.0
Z3 32.6 33.7 1.7 34.0 2.0 35.5 3.0
Z4 13.5 13.4 0.9 13.6 0.9 13.7 0.9
Z5 46.2 44.8 1.9 43.8 2.7 42.8 3.6
Z6 12.9 15.2 2.5 16.4 3.7 16.3 3.5
Z7 51.3 52.6 1.9 53.9 2.9 55.5 4.8
% with Z1 19.9 18.9 1.8 20.0 1.3 21.8 2.2
educ.> 14.5 Z2 9.6 7.5 2.3 7.4 2.3 8.1 1.6
Z3 10.9 9.9 1.4 10.6 0.9 13.0 2.2
Z4 28.3 29.3 1.6 27.8 1.1 28.1 0.8
Z5 36.6 37.5 1.6 38.9 2.8 38.2 1.9
Z6 25.8 26.5 1.6 26.7 1.8 27.3 2.0
Z7 30.9 32.8 2.6 32.0 1.9 31.8 1.7
Avg. age Z1 65.8 67.6 1.9 68.7 2.9 69.1 3.4
Z2 66.2 68.4 2.3 68.7 2.5 68.6 2.4
Z3 71.4 70.9 0.6 70.5 1.0 70.1 1.3
Z4 72.5 71.6 0.9 71.3 1.2 71.2 1.3
Z5 71.1 70.0 1.2 69.8 1.3 69.8 1.3
Z6 72.1 71.3 1.0 71.4 0.8 71.5 0.7
Z7 69.4 69.4 0.5 69.5 0.5 69.7 0.6
100 knots by randomly choosing a subset of the locations in the training
set. We assign flat prior distributions on regression coefficients β, an inverse
Gamma (2,1) prior for σ2e and a uniform prior on (0.01,1) for φe. The same
training sample, testing sample and knots are used for all analyses, that
is, we do not perform a repeated sampling experiment because of compu-
tational burden of estimating the spatial regression model. All models are
estimated using the “spGLM” function in R.
Table 5 summarizes the original and synthetic data inferences and pre-
dictions. For standard logistic regression, we estimate the coefficients using
the methods of Reiter (2003). Misclassification rates are based on predict-
ing Y˜i = 1 when pi = 1/(1 + e
−x
′
iβ¯5)> 0.5 and predicting Y˜i = 0 otherwise,
where β¯5 is the vector of synthetic point estimates for the coefficients. For
the Bayesian spatial logistic regression, we mix the posterior samples of the
coefficients from each of the five synthetic data sets, and report the pos-
terior mean and variance of the mixed samples. Misclassification rates are
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Table 5
Summary results for spatial and nonspatial logistic regressions. Results include point and
variance estimates for regression coefficients, and misclassification rates (MR)
Real data h= 1 h= 5 h= 10
Q
√
T q¯5
√
T5 q¯5
√
T5 q¯5
√
T5
Nonspatial GLM
Intercept −0.85 0.18 −0.76 0.21 −0.71 0.20 −0.67 0.19
Sex 0.60 0.08 0.61 0.09 0.61 0.09 0.61 0.08
Race 0.59 0.09 0.48 0.18 0.48 0.13 0.42 0.11
Age× 100 0.52 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.36 0.28 0.34 0.26
MR MR MR MR
In-sample 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42
Out-of-sample 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47
Spatial GLM
Intercept −1.15 0.43 −0.91 0.37 −0.83 0.44 −0.97 0.33
Sex 0.74 0.10 0.64 0.09 0.67 0.09 0.68 0.10
Race 0.82 0.12 0.62 0.23 0.61 0.15 0.56 0.13
Age× 100 0.68 0.25 0.65 0.31 0.48 0.28 0.53 0.28
σ2e 1.83 0.96 1.82 1.20 1.31 0.73 1.13 0.53
φe 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01
MR MR MR MR
In-sample 0.22 0.26 0.25 0.27
Out-of-sample 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.32
based on predicting Y˜i = 1 when the posterior mean of pi across the five
synthetic data sets exceeds 0.5 and predicting Y˜i = 0 otherwise. For both
models, we compute the in-sample misclassification rates as the proportions
of misclassified cases conditioned on the training set, and the out-of-sample
misclassification rates as the proportions of misclassified cases conditioned
on the test set. All out-of-sample predictions for the Bayesian spatial logistic
regression are carried out using the “spPredict” function in R.
For the logistic regression, Table 5 indicates that synthetic point esti-
mates are generally close to those for the observed data, although there is
attenuation in the coefficients for the synthesized variables. This attenuation
increases with h. Both in-sample and out-of-sample misclassification rates
for the synthetic data are similar to those for the observed data.
For the spatial regression, Table 5 indicates that the synthetic point esti-
mates are generally close to the observed data estimates, again with increas-
ing attenuation as h gets large. The spatial random effects parameters σ2e
and φe in the synthetic data are similar to those from the observed data
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when h= 1, but σ2e declines toward zero as h gets large. This indicates that
large values of h can weaken the spatial associations in the synthetic data.
It is also informative to compare the misclassification rates for the spatial
logistic regression in the synthetic data with the rates for the nonspatial
logistic regression in the observed data. In particular, both in-sample and
out-of-sample misclassification rates are significantly lower in spatial logistic
regression for the synthetic data than those in nonspatial logistic regression
for the observed data. This suggests that, when spatial dependencies are
strong, releasing simulated geographies enables better predictions than sup-
pressing geography, even when race and sex are also simulated.
The online supplement [Wang and Reiter (2011)] reports the results of
the descriptive analyses and the spatial regressions based on synthetic data
sets generated from the actual cause of death Y , which does not exhibit
strong spatial dependence. The results for the descriptive estimands are
similar to, and even slightly better than, those from Table 4. For the spatial
regressions, the synthetic data sets appropriately reflect the lack of spatial
dependence in Y . As a final illustration of the usefulness of the synthetic
data sets, Figure 2 displays maps of location by race for the actual data
and for three synthetic data sets (m= 1) based on a CART synthesizer with
h ∈ (1,5,10). Across all values of h, the synthetic data sets preserve the
spatial distribution of race reasonably well.
3.4. Comparison against random noise addition. When considering the
merits of synthetic data approaches, another relevant comparison is against
other disclosure limitation procedures rather than against the original data,
which cannot be made publicly available. We now compare the synthetic
data sets with only geography simulated against adding random noise to
geography, that is, moving an observed location to another randomly drawn
location. To make results comparable, we perturb each si by drawing a ran-
dom value s∗i from a bivariate normal distribution with a mean equal to si
and a diagonal covariance matrix with standard deviations equally set to
be the corresponding R1,i/
√
2. Here, R1,i is computed assuming that, in
the high-risk scenario, only geography is synthesized and that h= 1. In this
way, the synthetic and noise-infused data sets have roughly the same R1
risks, because ‖s∗i − si‖22 ∼ 12R21,iχ22, and, hence, E(‖s∗i − si‖22) = R21,i. For
comparisons, we repeat the analyses from Tables 4 and 5.
For the repeated sampling experiment, we add random noise to each lo-
cation independently 100 times, thus creating 100 noise-infused data sets.
For the noise infusion, four of the fourteen percentage-related estimands
in Table 4 have MSE> 3%. In contrast, when synthesizing geography only
with h= 1, none of the percentage-related estimands have MSE> 3%; these
results are reported in the online supplement [Wang and Reiter (2011)]. For
the age-related estimands, the MSEs are similar for synthetic and noise-
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Fig. 2. Plots of the observed data (upper left) and synthetic data sets for three levels
of h. Red dots indicate locations of black people, and black dots indicate locations of white
people. All values of (λ,φ,R,A) are synthesized.
infused data sets. Thus, for comparable levels of disclosure risks, adding
random noise reduces the quality of inferences for the descriptive estimands
relative to synthetic data.
For the regression analyses, we estimate the Bayesian spatial regression
with one data set generated by adding random noise to geography only. The
in-sample and out-of-sample misclassification rates are 0.32 and 0.38, respec-
tively, for this noise-infused data set. We observed similar misclassification
rates when repeating this analysis three more times. These misclassification
rates are substantially larger than those for the corresponding synthetic data
sets reported in the supplement (as well as those in Table 5), again suggest-
ing that, for comparable risk levels, random noise does not preserve spatial
relationships as well as synthetic data.
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4. Concluding remarks. Although synthesizing geographies via model-
ing, such as the CART approach here, can preserve some spatial analyses,
it does not preserve all of them. For example, two records close in space
in the original data will not necessarily be close in space in the synthetic
data, because their locations are independently generated from the response
distribution. Additionally, simulated geographies may not preserve analyses
when used to link the synthetic data with other data containing geography,
since the simulated locations are conditionally independent of the variables
in the linked data set that are not included in the synthesis model. Eval-
uating the impacts of synthetic geographies on linked analysis is a future
extension of this research.
When synthesizing the nongeographic quasi-identifiers, we controlled for
location as predictors in the model. An alternative approach is to simulate
from hierarchical spatial models for point-referenced data, or perhaps from
area-level models by aggregating locations [Banerjee, Gelfand and Carlin
(2004)]. With large data sets, fitting spatial random effects models can be
computationally challenging, although this can be overcome using approxi-
mations from the spatial statistics literature. Another strategy is to mask at-
tribute data using spatial smoothing techniques [Zhou, Dominici and Louis
(2010)]. We note that applying either of these approaches alone, that is,
without simulating geography, leaves the original fine geography on the file,
which may be too high of a disclosure risk. Evaluating the potential gains in
disclosure risk and data usefulness of such strategies over the simple CART
synthesizer for attributes utilized here is an area open for further theoretical
and empirical investigation.
To implement the CART synthesizer, data stewards need to select the
tuning parameters of the trees, that is, the minimum number of observations
per leaf and the splitting criteria. These parameters control the size of the
tree: increasing them results in smaller trees, and decreasing them results
in larger trees. Based on our experience, we recommend that data stewards
begin by setting the minimum deviance in the splitting criteria to a small
number, like 0.0001 or even smaller, and requiring at least five records per
leaf. These are typical default values for many applications and software
routines for regression trees. The data steward then evaluates the disclosure
risk and data utility associated with the synthetic data sets. If the risks
are too high, the data steward can re-tune the parameters for the variables
that are not sufficiently altered by the synthesis to grow smaller trees for
those variables [Reiter (2005d)]. We did not prune the leaves further, as
experiments with further pruning worsened the quality of the synthetic data
sets without substantially improving the confidentiality protection. Growing
larger trees can increase the quality of the synthetic data sets. However, it
increases the time to run the synthesizer. Further, it can increase disclosure
risks, for example, using trees with one observation per leaf reproduces the
original data.
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The CART synthesizer has appealing features: it handles continuous, cat-
egorical and mixed data; captures nonlinear relationships and complex inter-
actions automatically; and runs quickly on large data sets. However, CART
synthesizers can run into computational difficulties when categorical vari-
ables have many (e.g., >20) levels. Additionally, when some levels have low
incidence rates in the data, the CART synthesizer can have difficulty pre-
serving relationships involving those levels [Reiter (2005d)].
For simulation purposes, we illustrated the CART synthesizer using only
n= 2,670 records. This facilitated estimation of the spatial regressions with
each of the resulting synthetic data sets. In extended investigations, we found
that the CART synthesis process readily scaled for tens of thousands of
mortality records. Other applications using CART synthesizers for nongeo-
graphic attributes [Reiter (2009), Drechsler (2011)] indicate that it can be
applied in surveys of dimensions typical of many government surveys. When
data stewards need to synthesize locations for a very large number, for exam-
ple, millions, of records, a computationally convenient strategy is to partition
the data into geographical strata of manageable size (tens of thousands of
records), and simulate latitudes and longitudes (and attributes) by running
the synthesizer independently within each stratum.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Computational details and further results
(DOI: 10.1214/11-AOAS506SUPP; .pdf). Computational details for geogra-
phy disclosure and identification risks in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2; further
analytical validity results; and results based on genuine cause of death.
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